The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement.

Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies--notably the World Bank--often fail to enforce conditions. This pattern undermines the credibility of conditionality, weakening incentives to implement policy reforms. The standard critique attributed this time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to lend, defensive lending, or short-sighted altruism. Pressure from powerful donors provides another potential explanation for lax enforcement. This paper presents and empirical analysis of the political economy of conditionality enforcement in international organizations using the case of the World Bank and the United States. The analysis examines panel data on World Bank disbursements to 97 countries receiving structural adjustment loans between 1984 and 2005. Using macroeconomic variables to measure compliance and UN voting as an indicator of alignment with the U.S., this paper presents evidence that the World Bank enforces structural adjustment conditions more vigorously in countries not aligned with the United States.

Main Author: Kilby, Christopher.
Format: Villanova Faculty Authorship
Language: English
Published: 2009
Online Access: http://ezproxy.villanova.edu/login?url=https://digital.library.villanova.edu/Item/vudl:177701
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dc_source_str_mv Journal of Development Economics 89(1), May 2009, 51- 61.
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The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement.
author-letter Kilby, Christopher.
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dc_title_str The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement.
title The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement.
title_short The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement.
title_full The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement.
title_fullStr The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement.
title_full_unstemmed The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement.
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description Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies--notably the World Bank--often fail to enforce conditions. This pattern undermines the credibility of conditionality, weakening incentives to implement policy reforms. The standard critique attributed this time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to lend, defensive lending, or short-sighted altruism. Pressure from powerful donors provides another potential explanation for lax enforcement. This paper presents and empirical analysis of the political economy of conditionality enforcement in international organizations using the case of the World Bank and the United States. The analysis examines panel data on World Bank disbursements to 97 countries receiving structural adjustment loans between 1984 and 2005. Using macroeconomic variables to measure compliance and UN voting as an indicator of alignment with the U.S., this paper presents evidence that the World Bank enforces structural adjustment conditions more vigorously in countries not aligned with the United States.
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dc.title The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement.
dc.creator Kilby, Christopher.
dc.description Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies--notably the World Bank--often fail to enforce conditions. This pattern undermines the credibility of conditionality, weakening incentives to implement policy reforms. The standard critique attributed this time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to lend, defensive lending, or short-sighted altruism. Pressure from powerful donors provides another potential explanation for lax enforcement. This paper presents and empirical analysis of the political economy of conditionality enforcement in international organizations using the case of the World Bank and the United States. The analysis examines panel data on World Bank disbursements to 97 countries receiving structural adjustment loans between 1984 and 2005. Using macroeconomic variables to measure compliance and UN voting as an indicator of alignment with the U.S., this paper presents evidence that the World Bank enforces structural adjustment conditions more vigorously in countries not aligned with the United States.
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