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THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT, 13
powerful at Merv. This is avowed by Lessar and others. But Rus-
sia needed a pretext, and this not to justify herself in the eyes of the
Tekkes, but to blind England as to her intentions on the Tejend.
She did not wish her projected coup de main to be frustrated by the
action of England.
On the spot, Russia did not trouble herself about the pretext at all.
When the force proceeded to the Tejend, no ultimatum was sent to
Merv, nor was any attempt made to settle the matter promptly. As
a matter of fact, the sufferers had already done that themselves.
They had seized some camels belonging to the Mervis, and squared
their own loss by inflicting another on their neighbors.
Undeterred by England, therefore, Russia was able to consolidate
her. position on the Tejend, and await events. By the end of the
year everything was ready for the swoop. All that was now needed
ywas some complication that would divert England’s gaze, and mini-
mize the force of her indignation on finding the annexation of Merv
an accomplished fact.
The occasion was found early in 1884. The long-pent storm in
the Soudan had burst, and the Government were seriously embar-
rassed. Baker Pasha had just gone to the East Soudan to relieve
Sinkat, and General Gordon was on the point of starting for Khar-
toum. The belief was general that our troubles were only just com-
mencing in the Soudan, and in no country was this impression
stronger than in Russia.
“Events, consequently, were ripe for the swoop. The decisive mo-
ment, for which the Russian Government had deliberately prepared
by assembling forces on the Turkestan and Transcaspian sides of
Merv, had at length arrived. The signal was given for delivering
the blow.
_ Acting on the orders transmitted to him by General Komaroff,
Alikhanoff started off for Merv, accompanied by a few horsemen
and the hero of Geok Tepé, Makdum Kuli Khan. Arrived there he
put up for the night at the tent of Yousouf Khan, one of the four
chiefs of Merv, and brother to Makdum Kuli. Yousouf, like many
of the leading men, had already been bought over to Russia.
The next morning a public meeting was convened, and Alikhanoff
read out to the people Komaroff’s ultimatum. Immediate submis-
sion was demanded, and, to enforce his threats, Alikhanoff pointed to
the Tejend and announced the force established there to be simply
the vanguard of a greater army then advancing toward the oasis,
That the submission was not a purely voluntary one is proved by
the following passage occurring in the Russian Graphic ( Vsemirnaya
Illustratsia), from the pen of Gospodin Krijanovsky, a Russian officer
of Askabad, who sent that paper a sketch showing the submission
of the Merv chiefs in General Komaroff’s drawing-room. He says:
“General Komaroff, wishing to take advantage of the impression
which had been produced on the Tekkes by the despatch of a de-
tachment of our troops to the Tejend, ordered Lieutenant Alikhanoff
and Major Makdum Kuli Khan to proceed to Merv, and invite the
Mervis to beg for mercy and become Russian subjects.” The Scet,
which is edited by the brother of Komaroff, supports this by its dis-
closure of the threats which Alikhanoff used with reference to the
Tejend column being the vanguard of an advancing army.
Having already created a strong pro-Russian party by his intrigues,
Alikhanoff experienced very little difficulty in persuading the people
to accept the suzerainty of Russia. His arguments were no doubt
strongly backed by the renegade, Makdum Kuli, who was probably
compelled to dilate on the glories of Moscow, where, among other
things, he had witnessed, within a few paces of Lord Wolseley, the
feeding of half a million people and the review of 100,000 troops.
According to reports prevalent. in Russia, Alikhanoff secured ac-
quiescence all the more readily by wrapping up his terms in tissue
paper. He repudiated any intention of occupying the country with
a large garrison, All that Russia would do if they submitted, would
be to send a governor with two or three assistants, and things would
go on the same as before.
England was treated in a similar fashion. When M. de Giers
officially informed our ambassador of the submission of Merv, Feb.
15, he intimated that, in accepting it, the Emperor would simply
send ‘‘an officer” to administer the government of that region. He
added that ‘‘this officer would perhaps be accompanied by an escort
of Turcomans!” .
The solitary Russian officer proved to be as expansive as the fa-
mous four and ahalf battalions sent to Khiva a decade earlier. ‘‘To
ive an idea of the Khivan Expedition,” said Count Schouvaloff to
‘arl Granville, January 8th, 1873, ‘‘it was sufficient to say that it
would consist of four and a half battalions.” In reality Russia sent
to Khiva 53 companies of infantry, 25 sotnyas of Cossacks, 54 guns,
6 mortars, 2 mitrailleuses, 5 rocket divisions, and 19,200 camels, with
acomplement of about 14,000 men.
At the bidding of Alikhanoff the principal chiefs and elders signed
a parchment deed he had brought with him, and sclected a deputa-
tion to proceed to Askabad. On the way the party was joined by
Colonel Muratoff, the commander of the Tejend force, and arrived
at Askabad on the 6th February, two days after the annihilation of
Baker Pasha’s army at Tokar. The next morning, at 11 o'clock,
the four chiefs and twenty-four notables took the oath of allegiance
to the White Czar in General Komaroff’s drawing-room.
~ ‘When the ceremony was over, Komaroff made a short speech to
them, in which he declared that now they had made their submission
to Russia, they would find the White Czar a valiant protector of
their interests. ‘‘To prove this to you,” he said, ‘‘I telegraphed this
morning to Teheran, demanding that the Persians should give up to
you the hundred camels they took the other day, and I have just re-
ceived a message from the Shah acceding to my request.”*
Not a word was said about the cattle taken from the Persians,
which had served Russia as a diplomatic pretext for. assembling
Muratoff’s force on the Tejend. That was conveniently consigned
to oblivion. .
Russia, in a word, having made use of a Persian grievance to steal
the independence of Merv, rounded on the Shah the moment. the
theft was accomplished, and treated him in turn as a delinquent.
One can easily understand the Mervis exclaiming, ‘“‘ How great a
ruler is this Russian general! He has only got to send a message to
the Shah, and the sovereign of Persia submits at once to his dicta-
tion!” .
Several days were spent in feasting, and then came the dénouement,
General Komaroff decided to proceed to Merv, and this was made
the pretext for despatching more troops—as a guard’ of, honor!—to
the Tejend. Arrived there, the whole available force was set in mo-
tion behind the returning deputation, and Fort Kari Bent being only
three marches from. Merv, the Russian army was already close to
the oasis before its approach was known.
The elders were the first to arrive.: ‘They confirmed the reports
that the Russian army was advancing, and asked the. people to take
out water to the troops. A tumult arose. A strong party, headed
by Kajjar Khan, protested against the invasion, and threatened to
kill anybody who obeyed the elders’ request. They then applied
themselves fo the discussion of the best means of repelling the. Rus-
sian advance.
The Merv oasis is not very large, and it is surrounded on all sides
by barren plain or desert. “Retreat from it was practically impos-
sible. The Russians controlled three sides, and the Sariks — bit-
ter enemies of the Tekkes—the fourth. To defend themselves
against an invader the Tekkes had built an immense clay-ramparted
enclosure, capable of accommodating the entire population with
their herds and cattle. But there was no time to assemble the peo-
ple inside it before the Russians arrived. _The Mervis felt that they
had no course open to them but to surrender.
The reports current in Russia that Alikhanoff tricked the people
into submission by promising that no garrison should be installed,
are strongly supported by this tumult. If the army had been ex-
pected, the so-called “‘anti-Russian party” would have organized re-
sistance and made a stand somewhere. As it was, nothing whatever
was done, and when the intelligence arrived that the ‘Russians were
already close at hand, the only thing the Mervis could do was to go
out on horseback, and fire a few incifectual shots into the column by
way of a protest.
While the excitement was still prevailing, Alikhanoff entered the
oasis with a sotnya of Cossacks and endeavored to allay it. The at-
titude of the people, however, was so defiant that he thought it pru-
dent to take the advice of his Merv friends and fall back upon the
Newt army, then camping for the night twelve miles distant from
ery.
After dark Kajjar Khan, with several thousand horsemen, made
an onslaught on the Russian camp, but was repelled with heavy loss.
The next morning (March 16) the Russians marched early and occu-
pied the fortress without serious resistance. Lessar says that alto-
gether there were three fights or ‘‘skirmishes.” The Russian loss,
he adds, was ‘‘one man.” Kajjar Khan fled to Afghanistan.
The fortress was far too large to afford security to the Russian
force. General Komaroff, therefore, impressed several. thousand
Mervis at once, and compelled them to build, under the supervision
of his officers, a regular fort on the European principle. The com-
pletion of this scaled the fate of Merv.
In reward for his successful swoop Alikhanoff received back the
rank of major, and all his decorations; he was also made Governor
of Merv. Makdum Kuli was rewarded by being appointed head of
the Tejend oasis. Komaroff received the Order of the White Eagle,
his district was raised to the*rank of a province equal to that of Tur-
kestan, and he himself was made governor-general.
To further add to his importance, he was assigned permission to
carry on diplomatic intercourse direct with the neighboring states of
Persia and Afghanistan. In other words, if he wished to intrigue
with the Ameer without resorting to the instrumentality of. the For-
eign Office at St. Petersburg, he was at liberty to do so. Lessar was
appointed his diplomatic agent for this purpose.
The news of the occupation of Merv excited a storm of indigna-
tion in England. At first, the artful manner in which the Russian
Government represented the annexation asa ‘‘ voluntary submission ”
provoked a few excuses. It was said that as the people of Merv
themselves had asked to become Russian subjects the Emperor was
to a certain extent, justified in relieving himself of the burden of his
assurances to England. ‘‘ After all,” it was a happy ending to the
Turcoman question, and Russia, having got Merv and rounded off
her frontier, would trouble us no more. .
Before a week was over, however, Komaroff’s brother had let the
cat out of the bag. The editor of the Svet, himself a military oflicer,
t Krivanoveky’s narrative. .
Some of these particulars are taken from the narrative of a Turcoman e:
poate published m an Indian paper. They curiously tally with Russian ye-
rts,