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10 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT.
were to rob it before my eyes, I could not even wink my eyes. We
are not afraid of them; but we don’t want anything to happen to
you, the merchants of the great Padishah.’
“«*«The people are ready to obey us,’ added Kara Kuli Khan; ‘we
have no doubts on that score. But there are not a few kaltamans in
the oasis—robbers from whom we ourselves are not safe. They
might fall on your packs and on you yourselves.’
“**Tf we do not meet with any hostility on the part of the people,’
I replied, ‘we will answer for the rest. Our arms and our escort
will keep the robbers in order.’ .
“‘ Again a profound silence. Makdum Kuli exchanged significant
glances with his neighbors.
“«*T have said all I have to say,’ I continued; ‘we will now await
. your answer. If it "be the same as before, we shall prepare for the
. journey back to Askabad.’ . :
. “1 felt sure that the previous answer would not be repeated.
‘After another discussion Makdum Kuli said: ‘Tell the trader
_ that we are only. influenced by fears for his safety, otherwise, we.
', have nothing against him, and he may stop here forever if he likes.’
“**God forbid!’ I replied. ‘It will be quite enough to stop here
. .two or three market days to see what your trade is.’
“**In that case, here is our answer,’ said Makdum Kuli. ‘Let
him remain here two or three market days, and afterwards return to
', Askabad with the delegates.?” °'
*. This was agreed upon, and the assembly broke up. Alikhanoff’s
account of the discussion throws a broad light upon his adroitness
“in managing Asiatics. He thoroughly understands their ways.
. The Russians stayed a fortnight at Merv, during which Alikhan-
, Off made as many friends as he could, and intrigued against those
~ who were disposed to interfere with the accomplishment of his great
aim. Disguised afresh as a Tekke, he availed himself of “every op-
portunity to explore the oasis, and by stealing out at early dawn se-
cured unobserved a survey of the fortress of Merv.
Ile himself was quite ‘at home among the Tekkes, but Kosikh
grew nervous after hearing that some of the people had been plot-
ting against his life, and hastened the departure of the caravan.
Alikhanoff took advantage of the return journey to survey another
route between Askabad and Merv.
Shortly afterward, another Russian officer, a Mussulman, named
Nasirbegoff, who had accompanied Stolictof¥ to Cabul as topog-
_ rapher, was sent to Merv in disguise, and pushed on thence to the
“" Oxus. By this time the Tekkes had lost so much of their hostility
to the Russians that it was felt that an agent might be sent there
openly. Lessar was selected for this mission, and passed through
_Merv to Khiva without exciting any animosity. In this manner
Russia secured within a twelvemonth a survey of all the roads con-
verging from the Turkestan and Transcaspian oasis upon Merv, and
dispelled the disinclination of the people to receive Russian visitors,
Another success followed upon this. Alikhanoff, who had main-
tained close relations with Makdum Kuli, persuaded that chief to
throw in his lot with Russia, and proceed to Moscow to witness the
Czar’s coronation. His submission was considered a great gain for
Russia. He had been the soul of the defence of Geok Tepé, and
the authorities at Askabad had always feared that he might repeat
that terrible resistance at Mery. His departure from the oasis left
the people without a leader, and hencéforward the Russians felt that
they could afford to play a bolder game.
. » I saw Makdum Kuli several times at the Czar’s coronation, He
lodged with other Asiatics at a hotel opposite the rooms assigned to
. me by the Russian Government. The splendor of the Kremlin fes-
tivities thoroughly tamed him, and.when he returned with the rest
_ |, of the Turcomans to Askabad he was as little disposed to fight Rus-
- sla any more as Cetewayo after his trip to London.
AXnowing how great his personal intluence at Merv had been, Ali-
khanoff induced him to pay a visit there on his return, to describe
to his fellow-countrymen what the glories of Russia were like. His
descriptions of the sight he had seen at Moscow exercised a most de-
pressing effect upon the anti-Russian party, while at the same time
the handsome Russian uniform he wore, and the account he gave of
the favors conferred upon him by the Emperor, provoked a desire
among other chiefs to make the acquaintance of such generous
masters. .
CHAPTER IL.
THE swoor UPON MERY.
Rassia angry at our continued occupation of Egypt, resolves to seize the gates
of Hera cret concentration of troops at puints commanding Merv—Colo-
nel Muratoff goes to the Tejend oasis “to return,” bat remains—Sudden ap-
pearance of Lieutenant Alikhanoff at Merv—The intrigues resulting in the
acceptance of the Suzerainty of Russia — Russia promises to place only one
officer in the oasis—Sudden advance of the Tejend force behind the ‘Askabad
deputation of chiefs—The Merv Tekkes hurriedly resist, but are defeated, and
the Rassians enter the fortress—Alikhanoff made governor of Mery. ,
Just then the Egyptian Question was exciting a good deal of at-
tention. Our active interference in Soudan affairs had not yet be-
gun, and during the lull preceding it a general European discussion
was prevailing as to whether England should or should not evacu-
_ ate Egypt. Russia had never concealed her opposition to our being
there at all, and she therefore threw herself vigorously into the con.
Toversy. :
To understand her feelings properly we must endeavor to examine
things a little from her standpoint. Russia makes no secret that she
is determined some day to have Constantinople. Her longing for
the Bosphorus is as great now as it ever was in her career. The
most resolute opponent to her arms is England, Austria and Ger- °
many she believes may be “‘squared;” but up to now it has been
impossible to buy off England. Still, Russia has always nourished
a hope that when matters reached a decisive stage our acquiescence
might be purchased by allowing or assisting us to ‘annex Egypt.
Cairo was the price to be paid for Constantinople.
Ihave no space to go fully into the details of this policy; but I
have said enough to indicate that Russian statesmen could not be
pleased at our occupying Egypt and offering them no compensation.
We appropriated the power of Egypt; we assumed control of the
Suez Canal; and still we as fiercely.as ever refused to allow Russia
to advance upon Constantinople.
I shall be told that Russia had no right to be angry at our occu-
pation of Egypt, since we had no intention of annexing the country.
In reply, I must ask that matters be again looked at from the Rus-
sian standpoint. Russian policy is dictated by the impressions and
the feelings of Russian statesmen, not by the impressions of Eng-
lishmen, The general impression in Russia at the time was that
England had virtually annexed Egypt, and that the fluctuations and
contortions of Mr. Gladstone’s policy masked a cut-and-dried plan
for permanently retaining the country. :
Anybody who has lived in the military states of Europe can easily
understand how such an impression should have arisen. The states-
men of Russia, Germany, Austria, and France usually formulate a
policy long in advance of current events, and resolutely apply them-
selves to deliberately working it out. English statesmen, on the
other hand, mostly live from hand to’ mouth. The occupation
of Egypt was the result of no deep “design,” using the term in the
continental sense. England floundered into the Egyptian imbrog-
lio, and ee the errors of her statesmen did more to root her influ-
ence and;authority in the country than the cleverest scheming could
have done. Now, men who make events are apt to think that others
make them also. Russia, at first disposed to treat Mr. Gladstone’s
‘disinterested policy as generously as that statesman’s Liberal sup- °
porters, observed after a while that England benefited so largely by
his blunders that she began to ascribe them to a deep and clever
plan. :
When England first sent troops to Egypt there were three great ob»
stacles to a prolonged or permanent occupation of the country. In
the first place, the English public generally were averse to it; in the
second, the Egyptian people, it was thought, would never tolerate a
foreign ruler; in the third, most politicians held that all the Great
Powers would oppose it. : .
The first two obstacles had practically disappeared by the. autumn
of 1883. " After the collapse of Arabi Pacha’s army the whole of
Egypt proper submitted without a struggle to English authority.
Excluding the Soudan, the country proved amazingly easy to rule.
The people; in short, appeared to be so utterly unable to do without
their new masters that England began to look upon herself as marked
out by Providence to control the country, oO
Of course she only meant to control it for a time, but to Russia,
who had opposed any occupation at all, it was as obnoxious that she
should remain in Egypt three, five, or fifteen years, as forever, What
England considered a troublesome burden Russia regarded as a
splendid acquisition—a grand dependency possessing all the cle-
ments of a second India. Our continued occupation, therefore, dis-
pleased her. Finding we were indisposed to evacuate the country
at once, she decided she would establish a counterpoise in the East.
She resolved to reopen the Central Asia Question. :
he Emperor was perfectly aware that Merv was no counterbal-
ance to Cairo, or Sarakhs to Alexandria; but what he had in view
was the creation of a new base that would enable him to reopen in
turn the Eastern Question on advantageous terms. Merv, if a
“mere collection of mud huts,” as the Duke of Argyll expressed it,
was the stepping-stone to Herat, and at Herat he would be able to
put the screw on England if her policy in Egypt continued to dis-
please hin. o :
, + have been at pains to describe the influence the Eeyptian Ques-
tion had on the occupation of Merv, because, if it be Clearly appre.
ciated, the subsequent movement to the gates of Herat will be found
to contain a larger amount of menace than is commonly imagined.
The swoop upon Merv was no hap-hazard event, No local reason
whatever provoked it. Russia was not forced to occupy Merv by
any circumstance on the spot compelling her, against her wish, to
violate her numerous assurances to this country, I believe that I
am acquainted with everything that has been published in Russia—
official or non-ofticial—bearing upon the occupation of Merv. This
published literature does not contain a single charge against the
people of Merv, in excuse for the annexation. “
Therefore, all that has been written in England by writers -igno-
rant of the course of events in Russia, extenuating the annexation
on the grounds of the difficulty of keeping the Mery Tekkes in or-
der except by annexation, is theoretical nonsense. The Merv Tekkes
were in excellent order at the time, so far ag Russia was concerned.
They had committed no outrages on Russia, and were committing
It was as safe for Russian caravans to journey from Aska-
bad to Khiva, across a desert which, anterior to the previous cam-
i.