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June 9, 1920: The Committee on Resolutions at the Republican National Convention, Chicago, adopted
the following Plank which had been presented by Judge Cohalan and his associates on behalf of the Friends of
Irish Freedom:
“That this Republican Convention desires to place on record its sympathy with
all oppressed peoples and its recognition of the principle that the people of Ireland
have the right to determine freely, without dictation from outside, their own
governmental institutions and their own international relations with other
States and peoples.”
De Valera refused to accept that plank, and as a result not a word on Ireland was incorporated in the
Republican platform. This was another of De Valera’s outstanding and open acts of political folly in America.
is colleagues in Dail Eireann again supported him. Now, neither under the London Agreement nor
under De Valera’s proposed substitute therefor, is the right of the people of Ireland to determine
freely their own international relations with other States and peoples, acknowledged. Quite the
contrary!
October 22, 1920: Harry Boland, acting in collusion with De Valera, cut off the Clan-na-Gael from
afiliation with the I. R. B. in Ireland—thereby depriving the fighting men in Ireland of effective support from
the organization that had made the Easter Week Rising possible; that for over fifty years had stood practically
alone in the fight for an Irish Republic; that had the ability to get things done when it was humanly possible to
do them and when not hampered and dictated to by inexperienced men blinded with conceit in. themselves,
Boland’s mad action was supported by his colleagues in Ireland, but subsequently they were uncble
to defend their mistake in ratifying his decision.
November 17, 1920: De Valera in establishing at Washington, D. C., his new Association in opposition
to the Friends of Irish Freedom, attempted to put the finishing touch to his work of destruction in America. He
created dissension and turmoil among the supporters of the Irish Republic in this country, just at the time when
Ireland most needed united support in her desperate struggle. Even in this he was backed up by his col-
leagues in Dail Eireann,
Tested by time and by results, what did De Valera and Boland accomplish by their wrecking tactics?
Examine it from any angle and the answer is nothing, or next to nothing, or in fact worse than nothing—
for they weakened Treland’s chances and definitely laid the foundation for compromise with England.
Boland failed miserably in his mission to “deliver the goods” to the fighting men, in proof of which we
submit the following:
(1) We received repeated reports during the first half of 1921 from Cork
that the I. R. A. in that area found it almost impossible to secure arms or ammunition
from or through Headquarters in Dublin. They were told that the available supplies
liad to be distributed elsewhere.
( We received a communication from a prominent member of the I. R. A.
in the West of Ireland, from which we quote:—
“We are wretchedly equipped in the West, and without giving any secret away
I may tell you practically all the equipment is being sent to the South of
Ireland. We are tired of appealing to the powers that be for help.”
From this it is clear that Boland with the support of his so-called “reorganized Clan” and the A, A. R. I. Rs
—with millions of dollars to the credit of De Valera here,—failed to make good. Dublin Headquarters of the
J. R. A. instead of telling the truth to the men in the South and to the men in the West, kept both sections in ignor-
ance of Boland’s failure.
Yet the powers-that-were persisted in their support of De Valera and Boland, and were never bold enough
or frank enough to admit that those men made fatal mistakes in the United States, ‘The men in Treland permitted
those Envoys to run their course unchecked, and cannot escape the responsibility for the failure that resulted.
July 8, 1921: England owing to the magnificent fight which the I. R. A. was making—badly equipped
though it was—evidently not aware of the military situation from the Irish point of view; and more especially
because of her desire to appease American public opinion in face of her ever growing troubles abroad, asked for
a truce,
Through the negotiations which followed, England won by diplomacy what she had failed to accomplish in
the field.
July 14, 1921: De Valera went to London to talk with Lloyd George. This.was the next big step in
the compromise, .
Robert Barton, T. D., one of the Irish plenipotentiaries and Cabinet Minister. of Dail Eireann, criticizing the
present attitude of Michael Collins, and with a personal knowledge of developments in Dublin and in London,
corifirms many facts which we have often insisted on, and throws light on other interesting points. In the
official organ of the “External Associationists” (February 21, 1922) he writes:
“The theory of an Independent Ireland associated with the British Common-
wealth by some external tie was first disclosed to me by President De Valera at
a Cabinet meeting early in July, immediately after my release from prison. It
had then become plain that it was physically impossible to secure Ireland’s ideal
of a completely isolated Republic in the immediate future otherwise than by
driving the overwhelming British forces out of the country. As President of our
Republic, De Valera proposed to us an alternative to the projected war of extermina-
tion. * * * The framework which De Valera then outlined to us became
Cabinet policy and later was approved by the Dail. * * * * * * The inspiration
came from De Valera.”
August 16, 1921: De Valera said in Dail Eireann—“We are no republican doctrinaires.”
September 13, 1921: Boland admitted that De Valera had instructed him to return to America and
advise the people here that Ireland was going to accept “something less than a Republic.” This was con-
firmed by De Valera, January 7, 1922.
October 11, 1921: As a result of the protracted correspondence between Lloyd George and De Valera,
Plenipotentiaries appointed by Dail Eireann entered into conference with English | Cabinet Ministers in
London “with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as
the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish National aspirations.”
Lloyd George insisted, and De Valera and his associates in Dail Eireann agreed in advance that discus-
sion on the Irish Republic was barred from that conference.
November 28, 1921: According to Barton, the Irish Delegates in London on this date submitted to the
English Representatives this proposal:
“Ireland will agree to be associated with the British Commonwealth for all pur
poses of common concern, including defence, peace and war, and political treaties, and
to recognize the British Crown as Head of the Association.
“As a token of that recognition, the Irish Legislature will vote an annual
contribution to the King’s personal revenue.”
December 3, 1921: The Irish Delegates had returned to Dublin and discussed with the full Cabinet
of Dail Eireann the stage which the negotiations had reached. It is evident that the Cabinet—including De
Valera, Stack, Brugha and Barton—again ratified the idea of association with the so-called British Common-
wealth, and were prepared to pay an annual contribution to the personal revenue of the King of
England,
December 6, 1921, and after: De Valera would convey the impression that “Document No, 2” was
first proposed by him as an alternative to the “Treaty” after the latter was signed. We know, however, that it
existed and had been discussed long before, and that it contained impossible features from a Republican view-
point, including the following form of oath:
“| ____——do swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of
Ireland and to the Treaty of Association of Ireland with the British Commonwealth
of Nations and do recognize the King of Great Britain as Head of the Asso-
ciation.”
Before signing the Agreement, the Irish Delegates had the King’s revenue clause stricken, out, and “Docu-
ment No. 2” (or rather No. 3) when published subsequently did not contain it either. While it may be true
that the Irish Delegates should have consulted the Dail Cabinet before finally accepting the London Proposals,
we reassert that in the last analysis, “Document No, 2” (or No. 3) fails to safeguard the “sovereign right” of
the Irish people to “nnfettered control of Irish destinies.”
The following clause is quoted from “Document No. 2” (and No, 3):
“That matters of common concern shall include Defence, Peace and War,
Political Treaties, and all matters now treated as of common concern amongst the
States of the British Commonwealth, and that in these matters there shall be between
Treland and the States of the British Commonwealth such concerted action, founded
on consultation, as the several Governments nay determine,”